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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif f-llespondent,
-vs-

RONALD EASTHOPE,

Case No.
12739

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STA'l'El\IENT OF THE NATURE
OF 'THE CASE
The appellant, Ronald Easthope, appeals from
convictions of rape, robbery and sodomy in the Third
J u<licial ;District Court.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Ronald Easthope was convicted October 19, 1971
of having raped, robbed and forcibly sodomized Terri
Dee Gill. He was sentenced for an indeterminate term,
as provided by law, for each of the convictions.
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RELIEF' SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, Uonald Easthope, seeks reversal of
his convictions below with the direction that his case be
remanded.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
On February 2;j, 1971, two
officers ,·isite<l
Ronald Easthope a11d talked with him. They explained
that they were irffcstigating a case, and since they <lid
11ot have a search warrant, asked and received permis·
sion to search appellant's house. ( H. 34, as) On February 2G, Hl71, the two police officers again talked with
appellant about the case they were investigating. (R.
ai>, 48) The police officers asked appellant to stand in a
line-up, and when he agreed to do so, he was given the
l\Iiran<la warnings. (R. 37, 49) On the way to the police
station, appellant asked if he hacl to stand in the line-up.
He was tolcl that it was to his advantage to do so, since
he maintained his innocence. (R. 49)
The line-up was conducted that same evening (R.
Gill
as her assailant. (IL 41) l\Iiss Gill later identified ap·
pellant in court as the person she had identified in the
line-up. (R. 22)
H8), and appellant was identified by Terri Dee

After the line-up, appellant was arrested and given
the .Miranda warnings. ( R. 35) The police officers
asked if appellant wanted to make any statements. Ap·
pellant stated that he did not want to make any state·
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mcnt arnl that he wanted a lawyer. (It. 54} 'Vhen asked
who his lawyer was, appellant replied that he did not
have one since he had been unemployed and did not have
any money. The police officers gave him a phone book
opened to the lawyer section and told him he could call
anyone he wanted. (R. 54) Appellant then said he did
not want to call one. (R. 54, 5rj) In the same conversation about wanting. a lawyer, appellant made an incriminating statement, admitted into evidence, that he did
not think anybody could identify him with a stocking
over his face. (R. 54, 55}

POINT I

THE COURT BELO\V ERRED IN ADMITTIXG INTO EVIDENCE THE IDENTIFICATION AT THE LINE-UP.
Appellant contends that the identification at the
line-up should have been excluded on the ground that
he was denied his constitutional right to counsel at such
line-up.

In United States v. TVadc, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct.
rn:w, 18 L.Ed. ll49 ( rn67), the United States Supreme
Court held the Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires, absent an intelligent waiver, that the accused
and his counsel be notified of the impending line-up and
that counsel be present. In holding that the line-up is a
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critical stage of the criminal prosecution, at which the
accused is entitled to counsel, the court said:
... the confrontation compelled hy the State
between the accused and the victim or witnesses
to a crime to elicit identification evidence is
peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers
awl rnriable factors which might seriously,
even crncially, cl eregate from a fair trial. ( 388
at 288)
The court held the presence of a lawyer at the lineup would ensure the accused protection from unfair
practices. Furthermore, the court noted there is a seri·
ems difficulty in depicting what transpires at the line-up
and there are obvious risks of suggestion which attend
line-ups.
The impediments to objective observation are
increased when the victim is the witness. Lineups are prevalent in rape and robbery prosecutions and present a particular hazard that a
victim's uwlcrstandable outrage may excite
vengeful 01· spiteful motives.
The court in TV arlc also stated since the accused's
conviction may rest on a courtroom identification based
on a suspect .pretrial identification, which the accused
is helpless to subject to effective scrutiny, the accused
is deprived of the right to cross-examination of the wit·
nesses against him.
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In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct.
18 L. 1178 ( 1967) the court held that conducting
a line-up without notice to and in absence of accused's
counsel denied the accused his Sixth Amendment ri{)'ht
b
'
and called into question the admissibility at trial of the
in-court identification of the accused by witnesses who
attended the line-up.

lfl:j],

Appellant contends he <lid not intelligently waive
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the line-up
because he was not aware of the severity and possible
prejudice of such a line-up. Since he did not intelligently waive his right to have counsel present at the line-up,
the identification at the line-up should have been excluded.

POINT II
TIIE COURT BELOv,r ERRED IN ADMITTING INT 0 EVIDENCE APPELLANT'S
STATEMENT :MADE TO THE POLICE OFFICERS.
Appellant contends that his statement made to the
police officers should have been excluded on the ground
that it was admitted in violation of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination.

In 11Iiranda v. Arizona, 394 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct.
1602 L.Ed. 694 ( 1966), the United States Supreme
Court held the prosecution must not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from

custo<lial interrogation of the defendant unless it de111•
onstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the pri,·ilege against self-incrimination. Ily custodial interrogation the court meant the questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person had
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. \Vaiver of an
accusecl's right against self-incrimination must be made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
The court further noted that if the individual states
that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease
until an attorney is present. If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, the burden rests on the prosecution to
demonstrate that the accused knowingly, intelligently
waivecl his privilege against self-incrimination.
In People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal.2d 714, 68 Cal.R. 718,
441 P .2d 625 ( HH38) the court dealt with the aclmissi·
hility of a def en<lant's statement after he initially refused to waive his rights against self-incrimination.
Once warnings have Leen given, the subsequent
proce<lure is clear. If the individual indicates
in any manner, at any time prior to or during
the questioning, that he wishes to remain silent,
interrogation must cease. At this point he has
shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth
Amendment privilege and any statement taken
after the person invokes his privilege cannot
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be other than the product of compulsion, subtle
or otherwise. ( 441 P.2d at 627)
In People v. Ireland, 70 A.C. 577, 75 Cal.R. 188,
P .:!d 580 ( 1968) the court found that one of the
ways a defendant may indicate his wish that the custodial interrogation wholly cease is to ask for an attorney.
( 450 P.td at 587)
450

Appellant contends that he did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his right against self-incrimination.
Since appellant made an incriminating statement after
invoking his right against self-incrimination, that statement should not have been admitted into evidence
against him.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, the court erred in
admitting the identification at the line-up on the ground
that. appellant was denied his constitutional right to
counsel at such line-up, and that the court erred in admitting into evidence appellant's incriminating statement to the police officers on the ground that it was
admitted in violation of his right against self-incrimination, appellant respectfully submits that the judgment
of the court below be reversed and that his case be remanded.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID P. RHODE

Attorney for Appellant

